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For	many	ideologues	in	Congress,	voting	against
their	party	when	they	are	in	power	may	be	a	sound
electoral	strategy.
In	recent	years,	legislators	on	both	sides	of	the	aisle	in	Congress	have	often	voted
against	their	own	party’s	legislation	when	they	are	in	power.	But	why	are	some
members	of	Congress	disloyal	when	they	have	the	chance	to	get	things	done?
Jonathan	Slapin	and	Justin	Kirkland	argue	that	this	behaviour	is	a	form	of
grandstanding	whereby	ideological	extremists	symbolically	vote	against	their	own	party
to	distinguish	themselves,	while	knowing	that	their	party	will	still	win	the	vote.		Voting
this	way	may	also	benefit	legislators’	chances	of	reelection.
During	his	time	in	Congress,	Dennis	Kucinich’s	(D-OH	10th)	voting	record	marked	him	as	one	of	its	most	liberal
members.	Kucinich	advocated	for	handgun	bans,	animal	welfare	rights,	the	end	of	Federal	Reserve
independence,	and	a	variety	of	other	positions	associated	with	the	extreme	left.	He	remained	steadfastly	on	the
liberal	wing	of	the	Democratic	Party	throughout	his	tenure	in	the	House	from	1997	until	his	departure	in	2013.
Precisely	because	of	his	ideological	extremity,	Kucinich	should	have	been	a	very	loyal	member	of	the	Democratic
Party,	and	indeed	he	was.	However,	he	had	an	unexpected	tendency	vote	against	his	party	more	often	when	the
Democrats	controlled	a	majority.	Why	would	he	support	his	party	less	when	the	party	had	a	greater	chance	to	get
things	done?	We	believe	that	majority	control	gives	majority	party	ideologues	an	opportunity	to	connect	with
voters	by	voting	against	their	party	in	a	way	that	being	in	the	minority	does	not.
To	understand	our	logic,	we	first	need	to	understand	why	Kucinich	was	generally	loyal	to	the	Democrats.
Suppose	that	the	Democrats	control	a	majority	in	the	US	House	and	they	bring	forward	a	bill	to	alter	some
important	policy.	It’s	a	safe	bet	that	the	legislation	is	more	liberal	than	what	the	Republicans	would	propose,	and
probably	more	liberal	than	the	existing	policy	(if	only	slightly).	Given	that	the	bill	moves	policy	in	the	direction
Kucinich	prefers,	he	ought	to	vote	for	it,	and	thus	appear	loyal	to	his	party.	Alternatively,	if	the	Democrats	are	in
the	minority,	when	the	Republicans	introduce	a	bill,	it’s	safe	to	assume	that	Kucinich	will	vote	against	it,	and	again
appear	loyal	to	his	fellow	Democrats.	Ideological	moderates	(like	New	Jersey’s	Democrat	Steve	Rothman	or
Republican	Chris	Smith)	may	have	legitimate	ideological	reasons	to	oppose	their	party’s	policy	changes,	but
extremists	like	Kucinich	should	not.
This	conventional	wisdom	–	that	extremists	are	loyal	to	their	party	and	moderates	less	so	–	has	a	great	deal	of
empirical	support.	But	recent	events	in	Congress	have	led	us	to	rethink	our	conventional	views	of	party	loyalty.
For	instance,	with	Republicans	controlling	the	majority	in	Congress,	some	Republican	members	on	the	extreme
right	have	been	willing	to	vote	against	their	party	in	a	very	open	and	public	manner	–	think	Tea	Party	Republicans
including	Michele	Bachmann	or	Ted	Cruz.
Kucinich,	himself,	voted	with	his	party	roughly	97	percent	of	the	time	when	Democrats	were	in	the	minority,	but
when	the	Democrats	took	majority	control	of	the	House	his	loyalty	fell	to	92	percent.	In	contrast,	Steve	Rothman
(our	Democratic	moderate)	was	most	loyal	to	his	fellow	Democrats	when	they	were	in	majority,	and	least	loyal
when	in	the	minority.	Extremists	do	tend	to	be	more	loyal	than	their	moderate	peers,	but	their	loyalties	shift	in
different	and	interesting	ways	with	changing	partisan	control.
These	changes	aren’t	limited	to	Kucinich	and	Rothman	either.	Figure	1	below	shows	how	loyalty	rates	change	for
the	10	percent	most	and	least	ideologically	extreme	members	of	the	House	as	their	party	switch	majority	and
minority	status	over	time.	Extremists	tend	to	become	less	loyal	as	their	party	moves	to	the	majority,	while
moderates	tend	to	become	more	loyal.
Figure	1	–	Changes	in	Loyalty	Rates	in	Majority	and	Minority
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To	explain	this	pattern,	we	develop	a	theory	of	strategic	party	disloyalty.	When	extremists	move	from	minority	to
majority	party	status,	we	argue	that	they	occasionally	vote	against	their	party	to	distinguish	themselves	from	the
rest	of	the	party,	and	to	help	make	a	name	for	themselves	without	appearing	to	support	the	opposition.	They	often
suggest	that	their	party’s	legislation	fails	to	“do	enough”	to	change	the	existing	policy.	We	call	this	sort	of	behavior
“grandstanding”.		It	is	tough	for	extremists	in	the	minority	party	to	behave	similarly	because	their	party	does	not
have	control	over	which	bills	come	up	for	a	vote.	Moderates	also	have	little	incentive	to	grandstand	—	suggesting
their	party	has	not	created	sufficiently	extreme	legislation	wouldn’t	be	in	their	own	interests.
By	United	States	House	of	Representatives	or	Office	of	the	Speaker	of	the	House	[Public	domain],	via	Wikimedia	Commons
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Furthermore,	this	behavior	is	strategic	because	extremists	are	most	likely	to	“grandstand”	on	votes	when	they	are
confident	that	their	party	will	win	(i.e.	final	passage	votes).	This	behavior	is	less	prevalent	on	more	critical	votes
that	determine	the	agenda	itself	(procedural	votes).		Thus,	their	efforts	to	grandstand	tend	not	to	hurt	their	party
on	key	votes.	Their	disloyalty	is	instead	a	symbolic	act	meant	to	impress	their	constituents.	After	looking	at	levels
of	party	loyalty	on	different	types	of	votes,	we	uncover	strong	evidence	for	our	arguments.	The	figure	below
provides	a	quick	snapshot	of	our	findings.	In	the	figures,	we	show	that	on	final	passage	votes,	extremists	are
more	loyal	to	their	party	in	the	minority,	but	moderates	are	most	loyal	to	their	party	in	the	majority,	and	we	show
that	these	patterns	are	much	stronger	for	final	passage	votes	in	the	House	than	procedural	votes.
Figure	2	–	Predicted	probability	of	party	loyalty
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Lastly,	we	examine	whether	“grandstanding”	has	electoral	roots.	We	examine	House	members’	electoral	success
as	a	function	of	their	party	loyalty,	ideology,	and	party	status.	Existing	research	suggests	that	excessive	party
loyalty	can	hurt	re-election	chances.	Our	analysis	rather	suggests	that	high	party	loyalty	helps	majority	party
moderates	and	minority	party	extremists,	and	hurts	minority	party	moderates	and	majority	party	extremists.	Thus,
these	House	members	are	adopting	strategies	of	party	loyalty	that	most	maximize	their	chances	at	re-election.
The	results	suggest	that	the	puzzling	behavior	of	ideological	extremists	in	Congress	has	roots	in	the	demands	of
their	constituents.
The	implications	of	our	argument	are	considerable.	Some	recent	observers	of	Congress	have	noted	the
dysfunction	within	the	Congressional	parties.	Our	research	suggests	that	some	of	this	internal	discord	may	have
roots	in	members’	need	to	espouse	constituent	preferences.	Additionally,	this	pattern	of	extremist	disloyalty	is
quite	common	in	Westminster-style	systems	like	the	British	Parliament,	further	amplifying	recent	concerns	that
Congress	is	becoming	more	Parliament-like,	but	without	the	institutions	that	allow	for	effective	parliamentary
democracy.
This	article	is	based	on	the	paper,	‘Ideology	and	strategic	party	disloyalty	in	the	US	house	of	representatives’	in
Electoral	Studies.
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